

~~SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

9 April 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT : The 1970-71 Military Estimates--
The Record Brought Up to Date

11-14-71

1. NIE 11-14 appears to be finally on its way, though another month or more may pass before it gets to USIB. On 31 March ONE circulated within the building a three pound twelve ounce draft--some 75 pages of main text plus annexes. I am informed that this text (the result of protracted and time-consuming consultation with OSR specialists by the ONE staff) represents a remarkably faithful rendition of the facts and judgments provided by us and with minor corrections (many already accepted by the ONE staff) is quite satisfactory to us. The text still lacks a future developments section and conclusions.

25X1A9a

2. [REDACTED] discussed the draft with his Board colleagues on 7 April, with [REDACTED] present, observing that he thought the annexes were ready to go out for coordination and that the main text--though in need of shortening and restructuring--was one he could make a start with. The Board generally agreed with his comments. The plan is to send out the text for information along with the annexes, with a note saying that a redraft as well as a future developments section will be forthcoming later.

25X1A9a

25X1A9a


25X1A9a

3. Throughout, [REDACTED] was at pains to solicit [REDACTED] views and may actually be identifying with the estimates, as the SMT Staff seems clearly to be doing.

25X1A9a

4. [REDACTED] proposed a new coordination procedure for the annexes, which his colleagues thought worth a try. To summarize, he proposes to ask for written suggested changes within about three weeks,

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

to have no formal Reps meetings, and to handle any unresolved problems through special working parties. He also proposed that DIA report back for all of the services--a suggestion which drew considerable criticism.

25X1A9a 5. The future developments/projections section is the principal remaining order of business. Just before [REDACTED] left he called [REDACTED] 25X1A9a attention to the emphasis in the President's memo on the usefulness of projections and the implications for 11-14. I followed up a couple of days later with an informal 22 March memo to [REDACTED] enclosing a 16-page outline of suggestions for a projections section which we'd had prepared by [REDACTED] people. 25X1A9a 25X1A9a 25X1A9a [REDACTED] and I had a friendly chat about it at the time and there has since been reassurance that some sort of estimative projections are planned. But 25X1A9a [REDACTED]'s word to the Board Wednesday was that a month would probably be required to redo the present main text and add a projections section.

NIE 11-10-71

25X1A9a 6. Meanwhile, 11-10 has encountered trouble. On 13 March [REDACTED] finally issued a 95-page "preliminary draft" of his main text. (The annexes had been turned in and accepted by [REDACTED] well before this). The following week [REDACTED] called me up in distress to say that the draft was unworkable and to solicit our ideas on how to proceed. Unfortunately, I had to agree, as did [REDACTED], who 25X1A9a 25X1A9a 25X1A9a read the draft at my request.

25X1A9a 7. I think we're back on the track now. [REDACTED] 25X1A9a and I have discussed the paper and seem to be in good agreement about what the paper should say and how it should be recast and streamlined. Within this framework, 25X1A9a [REDACTED] has produced an outline of the central military section of the paper which both [REDACTED] and I think should work. The agreed target is a draft in about three weeks, which we will get in the front office before it goes forward. I've also agreed to provide an introduction. With respect to the primarily political and estimative sections, we have told [REDACTED] that we 25X1A9a 25X1A9a

-2-

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

25X1A9a

don't have anybody with the expertise and drafting ability available, and that [REDACTED], who had done some of the preliminary drafting, would probably be the best bet. ([REDACTED] has no one available.) This assessment appears satisfactory to [REDACTED] though he wanted to check it with [REDACTED] and be re-assured that it was fully approved on our side of the house.

25X1A9a

25X1A9a

25X1A9a

In Conclusion

8. Our recent experience with 11-14 and 11-10 would appear to reinforce some of the points I made in my 25 February memo. ONE can be induced to stop fighting city hall, even with [REDACTED] in the chair. But in no case has it been possible until the principal ONE people concerned have come to feel it was "their" estimate. Under present procedures, this can take a long time.

25X1A9a

25X1A9a

9. More than ever, it seems clear that we are not well set up to prepare estimates drafts on an ad hoc task force basis and that if we are to retain this responsibility will have to develop the people and review procedures to do it right the first time. [REDACTED] was doing the best he could and performed quite credibly with the annexes. But he was evidently not all that well suited to managing an estimate on his own. And because we lacked established review procedures and were busy with other things and not paying sufficient attention, his draft didn't get the review and editorial attention in the front office we would give even the lowliest IM.

10. Which leads to the tough question of where we go from here. I am tempted to say that the simplest solution would be to return drafting responsibility to ONE now that we have demonstrated how to satisfy the requirement--with the clear understanding that the DDI and DDS&T would still have a direct say about the content of CIA drafts. Without a drastic change in ONE's position and makeup, however, this would probably still leave considerable leeway for monkey business.

25X1A9a

[REDACTED]
Executive Officer
Strategic Research

~~SECRET~~